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1 . Introduction
The study on the cultural aspects of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) has a rich and
growing literature, although the economic
and institutional analysis on this subject is
still in its nascency. This paper is, to the best
of my knowledge, the first attempt to apply
Greif's (1994) "cultural beliefs" model to a
comparative institutional analysis of the na-
ture of MNEs. As a matter of fact, there is
fairly general agreement among scholars on
the point that Japanese MNEs share certain
collectivistic culture, as opposed to the indi-
vidualistic culture of Anglo-Saxon MNEs
(Kojima 1978 and Koike 1999). Although
there is plenty of description about cultural
aspects of Japanese MNEs in this line of lit-
erature, what is lacking is a formal tool to il-
lustrate the essence of this subject systemati-
cally and analytically. This paper may be
viewed as an attempt to provide a bridge to a
more formal analysis of cultural dimensions
of MNEs employing Greif's (1994) model as
an analytical benchmark.
I lay a special emphasis on the hypothe-
sis that Japanese MNEs, like Greif's (1994)
collectivist societies, are inclined to hesitate
to make managerial delegation to non-
Japanese talents. This paper concludes by
presenting evidence consistent with the hy-
pothesis: Japanese MNEs have a significant
tendency to send more directors (both the
top of the board of directors (BOD) and di-
rectors as a whole) from the headquarters to
their foreign affiliates than American MNEs
do. In addition to this, so far as the appoint-
ment of the top of the BOD is concerned,
Japanese auto-related MNEs are segregated
and collectivistic in the sense of Greif's (1994)
model that they are more likely to send the
top of the BOD from their headquarters.
The similarity between Japanese MNEs and
Greif's (1994) collectivist societies are also
confirmed in respect of (i) pay for directors
(or agents) and (ii) valuation on informa-
tion sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides a definition of cul-
tural beliefs, and then shows some important
implications of Greif's (1994) cultural beliefs
model. Section 3 describes the data source,
the sample selection, the variables and the
specification of the empirical models. Section
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4 summarizes and interprets the empirical
results. Some discussions on the empirics
and other broader issues are presented in sec-
tion 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and
suggests some directions for further re-
search.
2 . Greif's Cultural Beliefs Model and
Its Implication to MNEs' Behavior
The main hypothesis of this paper is that, as
shown in the introduction, Japanese MNEs
share collectivistic cultural beliefs in the
sense of Greif's (1994) model and have a ten-
dency to send more directors from the head-
quarters to their foreign affiliates than other
individualistic MNEs do. Before turning to a
formal empirical analysis, I shall address
three fundamental questions to the hypothe-
sis. First of all, what are cultural beliefs
anyway? Second, what are the implications
of Greif's (1994) cultural beliefs model?
Third, is there really any evidence to show
that the characteristics of Japanese MNEs
conform to the setting and implications of
Greif's (1994) model?
2.1 Definition of Cultural Beliefs
"Cultural beliefs" is a terminology that I bor-
rowed from Greif's (1994) epoch-making
work which formally analyzes the relation-
ship between the cultural constraints of the
societies and their economic performance. He
defines cultural beliefs as follows:
(C)ulture --- an important component of
which is cultural beliefs. Cultural beliefs
are the ideas and thoughts common to
several individuals that govern interac-
tion ---between these people, and between
them, their gods, and other groups---
and differ from knowledge in that they
are not empirically discovered or ana-
lytically proved. In general, cultural be-
liefs become identical and commonly
known through the socialization process
by which culture is unified, maintained,
and communicated" (Greif 1994, p.915).
It seems fair to say that this definition of
cultural beliefs, a formalization of an aspect
of culture as a whole, makes sense not only
as a reflection of reality but as an analytical
setting. Analytically speaking, when each
player chooses his best response to these
identical and commonly known beliefs, the
set of permissible cultural beliefs is restricted
to those that are self-enforcing. I employ
this descriptive definition in the present
paper.1 This definition implies that a cultural
belief is a kind of institutions, following the
definition by Nabli and Nugent (1989).2
2.2 Implications of Greif's Cultural Beliefs
Model
Greif (1994) offers an interestingly original
historical institutional analysis dealing with
the one-sided Prisoner's Dilemma (OSPD) in
the context of Mediterranean trade in the
medieval world. He compares the different
ways in which Genoese merchants from the
Latin region and Maghribi merchants from
North Africa would respond to the same
agency problem. In enforcing honest behav-
ior of agents, the different beliefs in the two
merchant groups (an individualistic belief
for the Genoese and a collectivistic belief for
the Maghribis) have implications for the his-
torical trajectories of organizational charac-
teristics of the societies and institutional
evolutions. There is no space for an extended
discussion on the article,3 but let me summa-
rize some important implications of his
model.
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[Implication 1] In collectivist societies, like
the Maghribis, the social structure is segre-
gated in the sense that each individual so-
cially and economically interacts mainly
with members of a specific ethnic or familial
group. On the contrary, in individualist so-
cieties, like the Genoese, the social structure
is integrated in the sense that economic
transactions are conducted among people
from different groups. Typically, when in-
ter-economy agency relations become possi-
ble, while collectivist merchants do not utilize
such an opportunity following their segrega-
tion principle, individualist merchants may
find it optimal to establish the inter-economy
agency relations (proposition 4 and 5, Greif
1994, pp.933-935).
[Implication 2] In collectivist societies, so-
cial structure tends to be horizontal in the
sense that each merchants serves as an
agent, and vice versa. In contrast, social
structure in individualist societies is likely to
be vertical in the sense that the class division
of merchants and agents are decisive (Greif
1994, pp. 927-929).
[Implication 3] So far as contract enforce-
ment is concerned, while collectivist societies
tend to rely upon informal institutions such
as moral sanctions against deviants, indi-
vidualist societies mainly resort to special-
ized second-party organizations such as the
court (Greif 1994, pp.924-925 and 936-939).
Among these, the first two implications
are, broadly speaking, the consequences of
the different efficiency wages between collec-
tivist and individualist societies (proposition
1 and 2, Greif 1994, pp.919-920). The last
point comes from the two societies' different
valuation on information sharing (proposi-
tion 3, Greif 1994, p.921).
2.3 Do Japanese MNEs Have Similar Fea-
tures with Greif (1994)'s Collectivistic So-
cieties?
As I mentioned earlier, there is fairly general
agreement on the point that Japanese firms
share certain collectivistic culture, as op-
posed to the individualistic culture of Anglo-
Saxon firms; one of the differences in the
economic literature is whether they deal with
the cultural factors explicitly (Itagaki 1997a,
1997b) or not (Kojima 1978; Aoki and
Okuno-Fujiwara 1996; Aoki 2010). Although
there is no systematic quantitative analysis
on the relationship between MNEs' national-
ity and their decisions on managerial delega-
tion, it is generally said that Japanese MNEs
tend not to delegate the corporate control to
non-Japanese directors (Itagaki 1997). In
addition, there are some interesting theoreti-
cal and empirical findings in the literature of
the economic analysis of Japanese firms,
namely, (i) Japanese firms are inclined to in-
vest in information networking among their
business partners (Hoshi 1994), and (ii)
their organizational structures are more
horizontal than the American ones (Aoki
1986, 1988). One may associate these fea-
tures with the ones of Greif's collectivist so-
cieties mentioned earlier.
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
we have solid rationale to hypothesize that
Japanese companies are something like
Greif's (1994) collectivist societies. Espe-
cially, I would like to focus my attention on
an empirical investigation whether Japanese
MNEs are segregated in the sense of Greif's
(1994) [implication 1] and have a tendency
to send more directors from the headquar-
ters to their foreign affiliates than other in-
dividualistic MNEs do. In this paper, I take
Corporate Culture and Managerial Delegation
中京経営研究 第21巻 第1・2号 49
up a comparison of Japanese and American
MNEs since they are a good reflection on
Greif's (1994) collectivist societies and indi-
vidualist societies, respectively.
It should also be added that it is not my
present purpose to explore all the implica-
tions above and search for more comprehen-
sive applications to the study of MNEs.
However, some other important implications,
such as (i) the differences in pay for direc-
tors (or agents) and (ii) different valuation
on information sharing, are briefly examined
later on to confirm the validity of my argu-
ments.
3 . The Data, Sample Selection and
Empirical Models
3.1 Data Source and Sample Selection
First, to pick up American MNEs' affiliates
operating in Japan (American affiliates in
Japan, hereafter), I use data from the pub-
licly available Japanese database, Kaisha
Shikihou (KS, The Dictionary of Japanese
Listed Companies), Fall 2011 edition, pro-
vided by Toyo-keizai Shinposha. Second, to
select Japanese MNEs' affiliates operating in
U.S. (Japanese affiliates in U.S., hereafter),
I use data from the database, Kaigai
Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (KSKS, The Dic-
tionary of Japanese Companies Operating
Abroad), 2011 edition, provided by the same
publisher, Toyo-keizai Shinposha. These are
standard databases used by academic schol-
ars and management professionals to ana-
lyze listed companies in Japan and their
foreign affiliates. The KS covers 3,596 listed
companies in Japan and the KSKS does
22,400 Japanese foreign affiliates. From
these databases, I obtain cross-section data
on 133 affiliates, which can be decomposed
into 26 American affiliates in Japan and 107
Japanese affiliates in U.S.
3.2 Statistical Outlook
Before turning to the regression modeling,
let me show a statistical outlook of the 133
sample companies. I use the same sample in
my empirical analysis later.
Table 1, indicating the industrial distri-
bution of Japanese affiliates in U.S. (the sec-
ond and third column) and Japanese affili-
ates in U.S. (the fourth and fifth column),
vividly illustrates the different features of
these two groups. The table proves that
about two-fifths of Japanese affiliates in
U.S. are concentrating only in the auto-
related industry and 14 per cent in the elec-
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J. Affiliates (in U.S.) A. Affiliates (in Japan)
Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
1) Auto Related 43 40.2 3 11.5
2) Chemical 12 11.2 2 7.7
3) Electrics & Electronics 15 14.0 2 7.7
4) Foods 3 2.8 1 3.8
5) Service/IT 0 0.0 7 26.9
6) Service/Others 15 14.0 9 34.6
7) Machinery 14 13.1 0 0.0
8) Metals & Ceramics 3 2.8 1 3.8
9) Others 2 1.9 1 3.8
Total 107 100.0 26 100.0
Table 1: Industrial Distribution
Source: (1) Japanese affiliates in U.S.: Kaigai Shinshutsu Nippon Kigyo Soran, 2011, Toyo-keizai Shinposha.
(2) American affiliates in Japan: Kaisha Shikihou, Fall 2011, Toyo-keizai Shinposha.
trical and electronics goods industry. On the
other hand, for American ones in Japan, the
share of service sector is remarkably high,
more than three-fifths.
Next, table 2 summarizes the basic sta-
tistics of these sample companies. It com-
pares the mean values of Japanese and
American affiliates in terms of (i) the share
of the directors who are sent from their
headquarters, and (ii) whether the top of the
BOD, such as a chairperson, the CEO, a man-
aging director, is sent from their headquar-
ters (yes is counted by 1; otherwise, 0), (iii)
the shareholding of parent companies, (iv)
age, (v) sales turnover, and (vi) the number
of employees. As the table indicates, Japa-
nese affiliates in U.S. are, relatively speak-
ing, owned in large proportion by the parent
companies (87.6 per cent vis--vis 51.5 per
cent), old (19.1 years vis--vis 16.8 years),
small in sales scale (470 million U.S. dollars
vis--vis 2,654 million) and employment (920
vis--vis 5,415).
More noteworthy are the differentials in
their decision of managerial delegation.
First, the proportion of the directors from
their headquarters (SHHQ in table 2) in
Japanese affiliates in U.S. is markedly lower
than the one of Americans in Japan (63.9 per
cent vis--vis 28.4 per cent). Second, the
probabilities that the top of the directors is
sent from their headquarters also differ
sharply: the probability that the top of Japa-
nese affiliates in U.S. is from their headquar-
ters (TPHQ in table 2) is higher than the one
in American affiliates in Japan (62.9 per cent
vis--vis 30.8 per cent). The differentials be-
tween these two groups are both statistically
significant at 1 per cent level. These findings
appear to support my hypothesis that Japa-
nese MNEs have a tendency to send more
(top) directors from the headquarters to
their foreign affiliates than American MNEs
do. However, these decisive differentials may
be, at least to some extent, due to the fact
that the share of parent company ownership
in Japanese affiliates is higher than that of
Americans. The aim of the regression analy-
sis in the next section is, therefore, to look at
the difference in managerial delegation deci-
sions between Japanese and American
MNEs, after controlling the effects of the
share of parent company ownership (and
other controls).
3.3 The Models
The following regression models examine the
hypothesis spelled out in the last section:
that is, whether Japanese MNEs have ten-
dency to send more (top) directors from the
headquarters to their foreign subsidiaries
than American MNEs do. Dependent vari-
able of model 1 and model 2 are (i) the pro-
portion of the directors from their head-
quarters (SHHQ) and (ii) the probability
that the top of the BOD is sent from their
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SHHQ TPHQ P's Share Age Sales Employees
[1] J. Affiliates (in U.S.) 0.639 0.692 0.876 19.1 470 920
[2] A. Affiliates (in Japan). 0.284 0.308 0.515 16.8 2,654 5,415
Differential ([1]-[2]) 0.355*** 0.384*** 0.361** 2.3 -2,184*** -4,495***
Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Sample Companies
Source: Same as table 1.
Notes: (1) Means of top's nationality are calculated using the binary measure {If from its parent company=1,
if not=0}.
(2) Sales volume: Million U.S.$.
(3) *** Significant at 1 per cent, **Significant at 5 per cent.
headquarters, respectively. I apply OLS esti-
mation for model 1 and probit model estima-
tion for model 2.4 For each model, I include
some control variables which may have im-
pacts on the decision of director appoint-
ment.
[Model 1] SHHQ = β0 + β1 PSH + β2 SAL +
β3 AGE + β4 JPD + β5 SVD +β6 ITD +β7
ATD + ε (OLS regression),
[Model 2] TPHQ =β0 + β1 PSH + β2 SAL +
β3 AGE + β4 JPD + β5 SVD +β6 ITD +β7
ATD + ε (probit model regression).
The most crucial independent variable
for my analysis is JPD, a Japanese MNE
dummy variable which represents whether
the firm belongs to Japanese affiliates in
U.S. Among controls, the proportion of par-
ent company's shareholding (PSH) is ex-
pected to have strong positive impacts on the
dependent variables in each model. In addi-
tion to this, I chose sales turnover (SAL),
age of the company (AGE), and three indus-
try dummies (a service industry dummy
(SVD), an IT industry dummy (ITD) and an
auto-related industry dummy (ATD)) as
controls. Age variable has a reasonable ex-
pectation to produce a negative effect (the
older the company is, the more managerial
delegation to indigenous talents).
4 . Empirical Findings
4.1 Directors Sent from the Headquarters
(SHHQ) and Japanese MNE Dummy
Column 1 and 2 of table 3 summarizes the es-
timation results of model 1 for all 133 Japa-
nese and American affiliates.
First and foremost, I can find that Japa-
nese MNE dummy has a positive and statisti-
cally significant impact on the proportion of
the directors from their headquarters. This
result indicates that my main hypothesis,
which says that Japanese MNEs have a ten-
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Dependent Variable SHHQ TPHQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS OLS Probit Probit
Independent Variables:
Parent's Shareholdings 0.484*** 0.481*** 1.485*** 2.948***
[0.091] [0.098] [0.547] [0.741]
Sales Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age of the Company -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.011]
Japanese MNE dummy 0.186*** 0.200*** 0.567* -0.526
[0.059] [0.073] [0.350] [0.467]
Service Industry Dummy 0.015 -0.114
[0.054] [0.325]
IT Industry Dummy 0.026 0.104
[0.070] [0.433]
Auto Industry Dummy 0.007 1.606***
[0.049] [0.406]
Constant 0.069 0.050 -1.058*** -1.901***
[0.072] [0.087] [0.442] [0.591]
Adjusted R Squared 0.377 0.363 0.121 0.247
Number of Observations 133 133 133 133
Table 3: Estimation Results
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) ***1% significant, **5% significant, *10% significant
dency to send more directors from the head-
quarters to their foreign subsidiaries than
American MNEs do, is strongly supported
by evidence. The significance is robust
whether the industry dummies are included
(column 2) or not (column 1). If I take up
the case with the industry dummies, Japa-
nese MNE dummy brings 20 per cent higher
proportion of the directors sent from their
headquarters compared to American affili-
ates in Japan.
Second, among control variables, parent
company's shareholding has a positive and
statistically significant impact on the de-
pendent variable, as was expected. Other
controls, however, does not play any signifi-
cant role in the regressions. Age of the com-
pany has a negative impact on the dependent
variable as was expected, but the effect is not
statistically significant.
4.2 Top of the Directors Sent from the Head-
quarters (TPHQ) and Japanese MNE
Dummy
The results of model 2 are shown in column 3
and 4 in table 3. As I mentioned earlier, I em-
ployed probit model estimation for this
model.
First, let me look at the specification
without the industry dummies (column 3).
In this case, Japanese MNE dummy has a
positive and statistically significant impact
on the probability that the top of the BOD is
sent from their headquarters. Computation
of marginal effect (when Japanese MNE
dummy goes 0 to 1) using this specification
shows that the probability that Japanese
MNEs send the top of the BOD from the
headquarters is 18.2 per cent higher than the
one that American MNEs do. This result
confirms the robustness of my main hypo-
thesis in terms of top managerial delegation.
What is interesting, however, is the result of
the specification with the industry dummies
(column 4). In this setting, the significance
of Japanese dummy disappears and then the
auto industry dummy shows a strong posi-
tive correlation with the dependent variable.
Judging from the fact that 26 out of 29 auto-
related companies in the sample are Japanese
affiliates in U.S., it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that, among Japanese MNEs, auto-
related ones are specifically conservative in
the sense that they are more likely to send
the top of the BOD from the headquarters.
So far as the other controls are con-
cerned, the results are broadly similar with
the ones in model 1. Parent company's
shareholding has a strong positive effect on
the dependent variable and the correlation is
statistically significant. Sales, age, and the
industry dummies, except for the auto indus-
try dummy, are insignificant in the regres-
sions.
To sum up, empirical evidence in my re-
gression analysis is strongly consistent with
the hypothesis that I spelled out in line with
Greif's (1994) model. Japanese MNEs have a
significant tendency to send more directors
(both the top of the BOD and directors as a
whole) from the headquarters to their for-
eign affiliates than American MNEs do. In
addition to this, so far as the appointment of
the top of the BOD is concerned, Japanese
auto-related MNEs are segregated and
collectivistic in the sense of Greif's (1994)
model that they are more likely to send the
top of the BOD from the headquarters.
5 . Discussion
The main hypothesis of this paper is, as I
have seen in the previous section, strongly
supported by evidence. There may be, how-
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ever, criticism which can be raised against
my arguments from various aspects. In this
section, I shall take up some potential objec-
tions to my arguments. Here, let me put a
conclusion of my analysis first: the potential
objections are not strong enough to deny the
validity of my arguments.
5.1 Are Regulatory Environments Compara-
ble?
One may point out the possibility that the
frameworks to regulate foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) are not comparable between
Japan and U.S., and thus my method of pool-
ing regressions makes little sense. For ex-
ample, between these two countries, if there
are remarkable differences in the rules of (i)
appointment of foreign directors, (ii) ap-
pointment of outside directors and (ii) the
limits of foreign ownership (they are some-
times sector-specific), my empirical results
may be potentially biased.
Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO) (1995) provides useful information
to examine this point more closely. The
Japanese government-sponsored organiza-
tion conducted a comparative study on the
FDI policies in Japan and U.S. JETRO's
(1995) conclusion is that there is no funda-
mental difference between Japanese and
American regulatory environments in FDI,
expect for the fact that Japanese Company
Act sets higher hurdles in the case of outside
director appointment than American coun-
terpart does. It seems unrealistic to suppose
that this kind of minor difference causes a se-
rious problem in my empirical study.5
5.2 Is the Similarity in Managerial Delegation
Just a Coincidence?
Another possible objection may challenge to
my arguments in the wider context. That is,
the similar behavioral pattern of Japanese
MNEs with Greif's (1994) collectivist socie-
ties in managerial delegation to the agents is
just a coincidence and it is an exaggeration to
conclude, only from this ground, that Japa-
nese MNEs are something like Greif's (1994)
collectivist societies. Thus, in order to make
my arguments more promising, it is right to
pick up some other important aspects of
Greif's (1994) implications, such as (i) the
differences in pay for directors (or agents)
and (ii) different valuation on information
sharing.
The first point is a difference in pay for
directors (or agents). In a widely cited arti-
cle, Kaplan (1994) concludes that the top ex-
ecutives in large American firms earned, on
average, five times what the executives in
large Japanese firms earn in the early 1980s.
Using the results of the more recent survey,
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) show that pay for
the CEOs in U.S. was three times higher than
the one of the counterparts in Japan in the
mid-1990s. These findings are consistent
with Greif's (1994, pp.919-920) proposition 1
and 2 which imply that the efficiency wage is
higher in individualist societies than in col-
lectivist societies. It is true that Japanese ex-
ecutives likely receive more non-pecuniary
benefits; but, even so, the differences are too
huge to overlook.
Second, in respect of information shar-
ing, Hoshi's (1994) seminal work on the
Japanese business groups is an informative
source. He finds that Japanese business
groups (Kigyo-Shudan and/or Keiretsu) are
keen to share information among members
about their business partners through both
periodical formal top-executive meetings
(Shacho-kai) and informal gatherings
(Renraku-kai and/or Shinboku-kai). It is
natural that one may associate these fea-
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tures with informal and collectivistic mecha-
nisms of the Maghribis.
All the findings in this section strengthen
my arguments earlier. Now it seems reason-
able to conclude that the similarity between
Japanese MNEs and Greif's (1994) collectiv-
ist societies can be found not only in their
managerial delegation decisions but also in
other respects such as pay for directors (or
agents) and valuation on information shar-
ing.
6 . Conclusion and Some Future
Directions for Research
This paper is an attempt to examine a hy-
pothesis that the behavior of Japanese com-
panies resembles Greif's (1994) collectivist
societies. My special focus is on an empirical
investigation into the question whether
Japanese MNEs have a tendency to send
more directors from the headquarters to
their foreign affiliates than American MNEs
do. In short, my empirical findings are
strongly consistent with the hypothesis.
Japanese MNEs have a significant tendency
to send more directors (both the top of the
BOD and directors as a whole) from the
headquarters to their foreign affiliates than
American MNEs do. So far as the appoint-
ment of the top of the BOD is concerned,
Japanese auto-related MNEs are segregated
and collectivistic in the sense of Greif's (1994)
model that they are more likely to send the
top of the BOD from the headquarters. I also
briefly examined some other important fea-
tures, such as (i) pay for directors (or
agents) and (ii) valuation on information
sharing. The similarity between Japanese
MNEs and Greif's (1994) collectivist societies
is confirmed in these respects, too.
Since my discussion in the present paper
is just a preliminary approach to this issue,
it may be fruitful to suggest a line of re-
search which will yield rich dividends in the
future. The first issue is theoretical one
which is related to a stationary view of cul-
tural beliefs in the model presented in Greif's
(1994) model. The dynamics of the change of
cultural beliefs should be a core of the future
research since, as Basu (1995, p.32) suggests,
"norms do change and undergo mutations."
In this respect, to incorporate the dynamics
of institutional changes in the context of evo-
lutionary games is an interesting extension.6
The second issue is both theoretical and
empirical. In this paper, I employ the bilat-
eral comparison between Japanese and
American MNEs due to its sharp reflection
on Greif's (1994) collectivist and individualist
societies. However, to test the robustness of
my hypothesis here, one must inevitably in-
troduce broader comparative perspective.
Specifically, it is an interesting extension to
investigate the case that Japanese and
American MNEs are both penetrating into
the third world, which can be either some-
thing like collectivist or individualist socie-
ties. Again, an evolutionary game-theoretic
approach shows a valid direction to illustrate
the dynamic interactions between different
types of MNEs on the theoretical front.
Last but not least, I would like to men-
tion about the relative efficiency of the two
distinct economic systems, namely, collecti-
vistic and individual societies. Greif (1994)
suggests that individualistic system may
have been more efficient in the long run in
the context of Mediterranean trade competi-
tion. But, in the context of modern manufac-
turing competition, it seems to be the case
that Japanese auto-related MNEs, which ap-
pear as collectivists especially in regard to
top executive appointment, have competitive
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strength in the world market. After all, rela-
tive efficiency and growth performance be-
tween the different economic organizations
is, as Greif (1994) suggests, path-dependent
and case-dependent. Relative growth per-
formance and its path dependency in the dif-
ferent systems is an important (although too
involved to treat here in detail) subject and I
leave an extension of my interest to this di-
rection for my future research topic.
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Notes
1 This definition naturally raises the question
whether there is any analytical benefit from
distinguishing between strategies and cultural
beliefs. Unlike strategies, as Greif (1994, p.
論 文
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915) claims, cultural beliefs are qualities of in-
dividuals that affect decisions in historically
subsequent strategic situations. Typically,
cultural beliefs provide focal points and coor-
dinate expectations, thereby influencing equi-
librium selection and society's enforcement
institutions. On the other hand, Basu (1995)
and Nagaishi (2003) are the examples that ex-
plicitly identify cultural norms with a game's
strategy sets.
2 Nabli and Nugent define an institution as "a
set of constraints which governs the behav-
ioral relations among individuals or groups"
(Nabli and Nugent 1989, p.1335).
3 For an interpretation of Greif's (1994) model
from a somewhat different perspective, see
Aoki (2001, Section 3.2).
4 I also tried logit model estimation and OLS es-
timation for model 2, but the results remain
qualitatively the same.
5 JETRO (1995) examines only formal regula-
tions and pays scant attention to the informal
constraints concerning appointment of direc-
tors and acquisition of company ownership in
Japan and U.S. These informal aspects, how-
ever, definitely play a role in the managerial
delegation decisions of MNEs. I leave the issue
for a future research topic.
6 Nagaishi (2008) attempts a theoretical explo-
ration on the direction. See also Kuran and
Sandholm (2008) for an inclusive survey on
the recent development of the game-theoretic
approach to cultural evolution.
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